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ABSTRACT 
A majority of Justices on the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court have increasingly 
adopted a largely libertarian view of the constitutional right to the freedom of 
expression. Indeed, on issues ranging from campaign finance to offensive speech to 
symbolic speech to commercial speech to online expression, the Court has struck 
down many laws on free speech grounds. Much of the reasoning in these cases 
mirrors John Stuart Mill’s arguments in On Liberty. This is not new, as Mill’s 
position on free speech has been advocated by some members of the Court for a 
century. However, the advocacy of Mill’s position has grown over time, to the point 
now where it is the dominant view expressed by the Justices in free speech cases. 
Even where the majority has in recent years found limits to free speech rights 
(including in cases involving student speech, public employee speech, and speech 
related to foreign terrorist organizations), several Justices have advocated a Millian 
framework and arguably followed the exceptions that Mill outlined when advocating 
the Harm Principle for free speech. Through textual analysis of illustrative cases we 
demonstrate the growth of Mill’s influence on the Supreme Court and where the 
Justices have deviated from what Mill advocated. 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
* Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for 
Constitutional Studies, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire; Municipal Judge, City 
of Rice Lake, Wisconsin; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 2007; Ph.D., 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2007. 
+ Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire – Barron County; 
Ph.D., University of Illinois-Chicago, 2004.  
2020 Absolute Freedom of Opinion 3 
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 4 
II. JOHN STUART MILL’S FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE HARM  
          PRINCIPLE IN ON LIBERTY ........................................................................ 6 
III. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. BEGINS ADVOCATING MILL’S  
          FREE SPEECH POSITION ......................................................................... 16 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE WITH THE  
          FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ..................................................................... 24 
V. A MAJORITY OF THE COURT ADOPTS MILL’S POSITION  
          ON THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ........................................................ 28 
VI. THE CURRENT COURT’S FREE SPEECH EXCEPTIONS ARE  
          (ARGUABLY) MILL’S FREE SPEECH EXCEPTIONS ................................. 44 
VII. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 51 
 
  
4 UMass Law Review v. 15 | 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
adopting a broader vision of the freedom of expression that is 
protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although 
these decisions are not always unanimous, the Supreme Court’s 
growing free speech libertarianism can be seen in its striking down of 
laws and practices that have prohibited the following: burning the 
American flag,1 burning a cross,2 advertising alcohol,3 making 
indecent online communications to minors,4 advertising casino 
gaming,5 posting virtual child pornography online,6 making corporate 
independent expenditures in campaigns for public office,7 making 
contributions to candidates for public office in excess of aggregate 
statutory limits,8 depicting animal torture,9 selling violent video games 
to children,10 engaging in hate speech,11 lying about having won 
military medals,12 protesting outside of abortion clinics,13 accessing 
the Internet as a registered sex offender,14 adopting a racially 
disparaging trademark,15 and adopting a trademark that is regarded as 
immoral or scandalous.16 Considering this plethora of rulings, the 
modern Court is a case study in promoting a libertarian view of the 
freedom of expression. 
The Court’s decisions were not always so protective of the 
freedom of expression. Prior to World War I, the Court held a rather 
 
1 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
2 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
3 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
4 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
5 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
6 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
7 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
8 McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 
9 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
10 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
11 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
12 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
13 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014). 
14 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
15 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
16 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
2020 Absolute Freedom of Opinion 5 
crabbed view of the Free Speech Clause. Over the century since World 
War I, the Court has often struggled over how to balance what is 
protected by the First Amendment. With the notable exceptions of 
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis Brandeis, followed later 
by Justices like Hugo Black and William Douglas, most Court 
members from 1919 until the 1960s adopted a much more restrictive 
interpretation of the freedom of expression. The majority of Justices 
instead used the Bad Tendency Test or a narrow understanding of the 
Clear and Present Danger Test to judge the constitutionality of limits 
on expression, or the Court deemed major categories of expression to 
have little to no First Amendment protection. Over time, however, a 
majority on the Court has adopted reasoning on the freedom of 
expression that mirrors much of what British political philosopher 
John Stuart Mill argued in his famous book On Liberty, where he 
advocated for the protection of “absolute freedom of opinion and 
sentiment on all subjects.”17 Indeed, support for this position has been 
growing on the Court and becoming more popular among its members 
for a century, coming to fruition in the last few decades and becoming 
the dominant view of the freedom of expression. Furthermore, even in 
recent cases where the majority has curtailed free speech rights 
(including cases involving public employee speech,18 student speech,19 
speech related to foreign terrorist organizations,20 and speech by 
judicial candidates21), the Court has been reasoning within a Millian 
framework and arguably adhering to notable exceptions to free speech 
rights that Mill described when advocating the Harm Principle. 
Our article will proceed as follows. Part II reviews Mill’s theory on 
the freedom of expression and its basis in the Harm Principle as 
explained in On Liberty. Part III describes how Justice Holmes, along 
with Justice Brandeis, began advocating for a position on free speech 
similar to Mill’s in the early twentieth century. Part IV explains how 
the other members of the Court struggled over the ensuing decades on 
whether to adopt a similar position as Mill and Holmes/Brandeis, with 
Justices Black and Douglas later carrying the mantle for this approach. 
 
17 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1978) (1859) [hereinafter MILL]. 
18 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
19 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
20 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
21 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
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Part V subsequently expounds on how the Court majority began to be 
swayed by this more libertarian view, with the current Court largely 
adopting it and repeatedly striking down legislation in violation of the 
Harm Principle. Part VI will emphasize how, even as the Court has 
become more enamored with the freedom of speech than at any other 
time in its history, there remain cases where the Court upholds 
significant restrictions on the freedom of expression; these cases can 
be seen as matching the exceptions Mill had to his general rule on 
when speech should be protected. Overall, through textual analysis of 
illustrative examples, we will demonstrate the growth of Mill’s 
influence on the Supreme Court and where the Justices have deviated 
from what Mill advocated. 
II. JOHN STUART MILL’S FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE HARM 
PRINCIPLE IN ON LIBERTY 
John Stuart Mill published On Liberty in 1859 to explain his 
utilitarian position on how to resolve the conflict between majority 
rule and minority rights.22 With the acceptance of democratic 
governance, majoritarian rule came to be seen as the legitimate 
expression of “the people.” Mill worried, however, that “[t]he ‘people’ 
who exercise the power are not always the same people with those 
over whom it is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not 
the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest.”23 Mill 
knew that he was not alone in decrying the “tyranny of the majority,”24 
understanding that too often, society is over-willing to restrict 
individual freedom on the grounds of preserving public order or to 
protect society from immorality. Mill did not dispute that there must 
be limits to individual freedom, but he worried that the limits which 
society draws are often arbitrary and reflect the particular “prejudices 
or superstitions” of the dominant group.25 
According to Mill, the Harm Principle is the appropriate way to 
resolve this conflict. He described the Harm Principle as follows in On 
Liberty: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
 
22 Elizabeth Rapaport, Editor’s Introduction to MILL, supra note 17, at vii–viii. 
23 MILL, supra note 17, at 4. 
24 Terence H. Qualter, John Stuart Mill, Disciple of de Tocqueville, 13 W. POL. Q. 
880, 883–84 (1960). 
25 MILL, supra note 17, at 6. 
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prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not 
a sufficient warrant.”26 In other words, government should generally 
protect individual liberties, even if exercising them may cause harm to 
the person exercising those liberties or will be immoral in some way. It 
is only the causing of physical harm or property harm to others that 
Mill finds to be a sufficient justification for restraining human 
freedoms.27 Mill continued to say that one “cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to 
do so would be wise or even right.”28 Put another, more succinct, way, 
“[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.”29 Mill’s position on freedom was part of his greater 
philosophy of utilitarianism, whereby he modified Jeremy Bentham’s 
notion of the Greatest Happiness Principle.30 Mill regarded utility to 
mean that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness” and “wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness,” with special emphasis placed on the “higher pleasures” 
that include intellectual pursuits.31 This distinction by Mill explains 
why the focus of On Liberty is connecting individual liberty with well-
being and, indeed, to the capacity to flourish as a human being. A 
person who does not evaluate his or her life critically (through neglect 
or because of a lack of freedom), “does not educate or develop in him 
any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human 
being. The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative 
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised only 
in making a choice.”32 As we will explore below, this explains why the 
freedom of expression in particular was an important right to be 
protected in Mill’s scheme. 
There are limits to Mill’s Harm Principle, however. Mill did not 
advocate that this level of freedom should pertain to all persons. First, 
 
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 120–21 (1999). 
28 MILL, supra note 17, at 9. 
29 Id. 
30 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 3–4 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 
1979) (1861). 
31 Id. at 7, 10. 
32 MILL, supra note 17, at 56. 
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Mill proclaimed that “[i]t is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this 
doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of 
their faculties. We are not speaking of children or of young persons 
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood.”33 Therefore, one needs to reach a certain age and stage 
of mental development before the Harm Principle applies, and before 
such an age, society may put more limits on one’s freedom, according 
to Mill.34 His text, referring to the “maturity of their faculties,” also 
suggests that adults who are mentally ill or are below a certain level of 
intelligence would not be fully protected by the Harm Principle. One 
can derive this from later statements Mill makes where he claims 
limiting freedom is acceptable in the young because they still require 
“being taken care of by others,”35 an argument that could also apply to 
certain narrow classes of adults. 
Second, Mill did not believe that the Harm Principle was the 
appropriate way to judge freedom for “backward states of society.”36 
Instead, Mill averred that “[d]espotism is a legitimate mode of 
government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their 
improvement and the means justified by actually effecting that end.”37 
Mill also warned his readers against the “East” where “the despotism 
of custom” has made “a people all alike, all governing their thoughts 
and conduct by the same maxims and rules.”38 From a writer whose 
views, at the time, were so progressive on women’s rights,39 this 
racism and ethnocentrism may come as surprising; even more so when 
one considers that Mill emphasized our tendency to place an 
“unbounded reliance” on our own cultural, political, and social 
norms.40 Indeed, according to Mill in On Liberty, the following was 
true of many persons: 
 
33 Id. at 9. 
34 Rudi Verburg, John Stuart Mill’s Political Economy: Educational Means to 
Moral Progress, 64 REV. SOC. ECON. 225, 234–35 (2006). 
35 MILL, supra note 17, at 9. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 67–69. 
39 Wendy Donner, John Stuart Mill’s Liberal Feminism, 69 PHIL. STUD. 155, 155 
(1993). 
40 MILL, supra note 17, at 17. 
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He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of 
being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other 
people; and it never troubles him that mere accident 
has decided which of these numerous worlds is the 
object of his reliance, and that the same causes which 
make him a churchman in London would have made 
him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking.41 
Nevertheless, Mill’s language made it clear that he believed even these 
societies he called “backward” or filled with “barbarians” have the 
capacity to progress and that once they do, they too must be given the 
freedom that his home country rightly enjoyed: 
[A]s soon as mankind have attained the capacity of 
being guided to their own improvement by conviction or 
persuasion . . . compulsion, either in the direct form or 
in that of pains and penalties for noncompliance, is no 
longer admissible as a means to their own good, and 
justifiable only for the security of others.42 
Thus, according to Mill and in somewhat of a puzzle, “backwards” 
states may first need to be under illiberal rule, where basic freedoms 
are denied to them before liberal freedoms (like the freedom of 
speech) can be protected in the full sense that Mill envisioned.43 
Third, Mill asserted that “[t]here are also many positive acts for the 
benefit of others which [one] may rightfully be compelled to perform,” 
including “certain acts of individual beneficence.”44 For Mill, this 
categorical exception included things such as being required to give 
evidence in a court of law, to be drafted into the military, or to act as a 
Good Samaritan.45 This third exception includes situations where one 
has chosen to take on familial or public responsibilities—in those 
cases one can be compelled to act.46 For instance, Mill described in 
detail the “duties of the parents” to make certain provisions to their 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 William Voegeli, Liberalism and Tolerance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 319, 322 
(2017). 
44 MILL, supra note 17, at 10. 
45 Id. at 10–11. 
46 Y.N. Chopra, Mill’s Principle of Liberty, 69 PHIL. 417, 436–37 (1994). 
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children, including education and nourishment.47 Similarly, Mill told 
his readers that if one holds a job where one has responsibilities to the 
public, then one’s liberties may be curtailed more than would be the 
case for the general populace. Mill described this as follows: “when a 
person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the 
performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he 
is guilty of a social offense.”48 Mill went on to colorfully state the 
following: 
No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; 
but a soldier or policeman should be punished for being 
drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite 
damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an 
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the 
province of liberty and placed in that of morality or 
law.49 
These are all examples of duties one has agreed to complete. 
Therefore, the Harm Principle does not absolve a person of fulfilling 
“other-regarding” activities that one previously volunteered to 
undertake.50 
Upon explaining the contours of his Harm Principle, Mill turned to 
the specifics of the freedom of expression. He described what are First 
Amendment freedoms in the United States as the primary examples of 
the liberty that should be protected: 
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It 
comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, 
demanding liberty of conscience in the most 
comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling, 
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all 
subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or 
theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing 
opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, 
since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an 
individual which concerns other people, but, being 
 
47 MILL, supra note 17, at 104. 
48 Id. at 79–80. 
49 Id. at 80. 
50 Anthony D’Amato, Natural Law – A Libertarian View, 3 FIU L. REV. 97, 100–
101 (2007). 
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almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought 
itself and resting in great part on the same reasons, is 
practically inseparable from it.51 
The freedoms of religion, speech, and press were all tied together in 
Mill’s mind because they all stem from the liberty of thought.52 Mill 
referenced these three rights similarly to show how these rights were 
tied together in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”53 Mill advocated protection of a broad 
notion of the freedom of expression, encompassing modes of 
communication that are not just oral, but also written and in other 
forms. Furthermore, Mill announced that when it comes to the freedom 
of expression, “[i]f all mankind minus one were of one opinion, 
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than 
he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”54 
This is one of the strongest assertions of what should be protected by 
the freedom of expression. 
Mill next explained why the freedom of expression is a key liberty 
that needs to be protected in all cases, whether the expression is true or 
not. First, Mill declared that, for obvious reasons, the freedom of 
expression should be protected where “the opinion which it is 
attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true.”55 Mill told 
the reader that humans are fallible, and silencing a speaker who states 
the truth is “robbing the human race” because “they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth.”56 Put another way, Mill 
stated that “every age [has] held many opinions which subsequent ages 
have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many 
opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages.”57 Thus, for 
Mill, we may believe someone to be speaking something offensive or 
false, but we may be wrong, so silencing such a speaker is bad for the 
 
51 MILL, supra note 17, at 11–12. 
52 Karen Zivi, Cultivating Character: John Stuart Mill and the Subject of Rights, 
50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 56–58 (2006). 
53 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
54 MILL, supra note 17, at 16. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 17. 
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human race in the long run.58 Said differently, according to Mill there 
is no conceivable reason to silence the truth or what may be true. 
Second, Mill proclaimed that the freedom of expression should be 
protected when the speech contains both some truth and some falsity: 
[T]hough the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and 
very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and 
since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject 
is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the 
collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the 
truth has any chance of being supplied.59 
Even if a statement contains just a kernel of truth, the speaker is 
partially speaking the truth. In silencing that view, the government 
would, therefore, be suppressing some truth.60 Mill admitted that much 
speech is like this, containing some truth but also some falsity.61 When 
describing our observations, we may try to make ourselves (and our 
arguments) look better, or we may have simply misperceived an event 
or what we have read or heard. Thus, what we often say may contain 
some truth and some falsity. Mill saw no reason to ban such speech 
even if it has only a kernel of truth because of the great value he 
placed on hearing the truth. 
But what about the situation where everything that a speaker states 
is false? And what if we actually knew what they were saying is false? 
Would we be justified in silencing such a speaker? For Mill, the 
answer remained no because of the benefit to humanity of hearing 
contrasting views. Mill professed that: 
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the 
whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, 
vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of 
those who receive it, be held in the manner of a 
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its 
rational grounds.62 
 
58 Nigel Rapport, The Liberal Treatment of Difference: An Untimely Meditation on 
Culture and Civilization, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 687, 691 (2011). 
59 MILL, supra note 17, at 50. 
60 Mark Strasser, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, and a True Threat to Brandenburg, 26 
BYU J. PUB. L. 37, 56 (2011). 
61 MILL, supra note 17, at 50–51. 
62 Id. 
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Mill explained that there is value in us constantly reevaluating our 
beliefs and being able to defend them, or else we will start merely 
believing simple dogma. As he colorfully stated at one point in On 
Liberty, “[b]oth teachers and learners go to sleep at their posts as soon 
as there is no enemy in the field.”63 In other words, Mill believed that 
government should not silence these types of speakers, even when 
what they spout is something the overwhelming majority of society 
has concluded is an absolutely false statement. This perceived false 
view helps those who think they are right be able to defend what they 
believe to be true.64 
Mill’s strong defense of the freedom of expression, or what he 
called “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,”65 
against government interference applies to many situations. Take, for 
example, where Mill described that if one will “misstate the elements 
of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion.”66 He went on to 
write that “still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of 
controversial misconduct.”67 Mill also appeared to support protecting 
the freedom of speech against government interference when the 
speech is something we believe to be not only false, but also offensive 
and hateful.68 
Significantly, Mill argued that all types of speech ought to be 
protected, even cases where speakers engage in “intemperate 
discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like.”69 
The context in which this arises is noteworthy because Mill contended 
that demands for a “studied moderation of language” are a way in 
which the dominant group disenfranchises the voices of the 
powerless.70 For Mill, the language of protest, of satire, and of ridicule 
are, at times, the only weapons the weak have to make their case 
heard. Enforcement of rules of decorum in debate will often be 
 
63 Id. at 41. 
64 Jeremy J. Ofseyer, Taking Liberties with John Stuart Mill, 1999 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 395, 425 (1999); see also Rapport, supra note 58, at 691. 
65 MILL, supra note 17, at 11. 
66 Id. at 51. 
67 Id. 
68 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1596, 1649 (2010). 
69 MILL, supra note 17, at 51. 
70 Id. 
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selective, resulting in the government ultimately helping one side and 
hurting another.71 Mill warned that calls for civil discourse are shot 
through with hypocrisy; when satire or intemperate language is 
employed by those who favor received opinion, “they may not only be 
used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him 
who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation.”72 
With such a mixture of ideas—the true, the false, the confused, and 
the intemperate—how can one come to the truth? Mill’s answer was 
the marketplace of ideas. We have already seen how Mill advocated 
that prevailing opinions are best fortified by hearing from the 
opposition.73 Later in On Liberty, Mill declared that people must “be 
free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to 
exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions.”74 However, 
Mill did not mean to make the reader believe that all opinions are of 
equal quality. Rather, Mill thought that the proper remedy to ill-
informed speech is to respond with well-informed speech.75 Mill 
clarified that while it is “obvious that law and authority have no 
business with restraining” speech, it is the case that “opinion ought, in 
every instance, to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the 
individual case.”76 Mill was not naïve and did not believe that the 
truth, in and of itself, will always win out, noting “[m]en are not more 
zealous for truth than they often are for error.”77 However, he did 
believe that the truth will always resurface and that it will eventually 
gain acceptance.78 According to Mill, the free market of ideas is what 
shall determine what is right and wrong in opinion, and the 
government should take no steps to limit any speakers.79 
 
71 Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand’s Seven Other Ideas About the Freedom of 
Speech, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 734–35 (2018). 
72 MILL, supra note 17, at 51. 
73 Id. at 50. 
74 Id. at 97. 
75 Id. at 52. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 28. 
78 Id. 
79 Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 
829–30 (2008); see also id. at 871 (explaining how Mill’s views on free speech 
formed a part of Justice Holmes’s conception of a “market-place of ideas”). 
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Beyond his limits on freedom generally noted above, the only 
additional limit on the freedom of expression which Mill allowed was 
when one’s speech might serve as an immediate incitement to harm 
others.80 As explained below, the modern U.S. Supreme Court has 
employed similar reasoning for permitting restrictions on speech. 
Thus, it is important that Mill’s “indispensable” proviso in this regard 
be fully recounted: 
No one pretends that actions should be as free as 
opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their 
immunity when the circumstances in which they are 
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a 
positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion 
that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that 
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested 
when simply circulated through the press, but may 
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an 
excited mob . . . . Acts, of whatever kind, which without 
justifiable cause do harm to others may be, and in the 
more important cases absolutely require to be, 
controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when 
needful, by the active interference of mankind.81 
Mill advocated for a narrow government power to restrict expression if 
there was a tangible and immediate threat of harm, such as provoking 
an angry crowd. The reason why Mill found this example to be a 
situation when the expression cannot be protected is because there is 
no time for the listeners to reflect upon the logic of such a speech 
when they are in a mob that is whipped up into a frenzy.82 As explored 
in more detail in the parts that follow, Mill supported restricting 
speech when that speech could lead to something similar to imminent 
lawless action,83 a standard comparable to what was advocated by 
Justice Holmes and eventually adopted by the Court in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio.84 This is also consistent with Mill’s advocacy of the more 
general Harm Principle to protect human freedom. 
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III. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. BEGINS ADVOCATING MILL’S 
FREE SPEECH POSITION 
For the first 129 years of its history, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
relatively little to say about the meaning of the freedom of expression 
that is protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, the right to the 
freedom of speech was not incorporated to apply to states until Gitlow 
v. New York,85 meaning there were few germane cases for the Court to 
review state action that touched upon this right. Furthermore, until the 
early twentieth century, a lack of relevant federal statutory regulation 
and congressional limits on the Court’s procedural and substantive 
jurisdiction left the Justices little opportunity to interpret the textual 
commands of the First Amendment as they applied to the federal 
government.86 Nevertheless, toward the end of the nineteenth century, 
the Court began issuing some significant decisions on the freedom of 
speech. The reasoning in these rulings, however, was a far cry from 
the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. 
For instance, in Davis v. Massachusetts the Court upheld the 
conviction of a reverend who preached on government property in 
violation of a Boston ordinance that prohibited making an address on 
public grounds without a permit from the mayor.87 In affirming 
Davis’s conviction for a unanimous Court, Justice Edward White 
viewed the ordinance as a question of government having the power to 
control its property, ignoring the implications for the freedom of 
speech (or the freedom of religion): 
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution of 
the United States does not destroy the power of the 
[S]tates to enact police regulations as to the subjects 
within their control, and does not have the effect of 
creating a particular and personal right in the citizen to 
use public property in defiance of the constitution and 
laws of the state.88 
The freedom of speech fared no better in United States ex rel. 
Turner v. Williams, where the Court upheld the exclusion of an alien 
 
85 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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who was believed to have advocated the political philosophy of 
anarchism.89 Chief Justice Melville Fuller wrote for another 
unanimous Court that held that the law which permitted the 
government to exclude or expel illegal aliens could not violate the 
First Amendment because, on its face, the law “has no reference 
to . . . nor [does it] abridge the freedom of speech.”90 According to 
Chief Justice Fuller, any constitutional protections for the freedom of 
speech applied to citizens only; even if Turner was “cut off 
from . . . speaking or publishing . . . in the country,” it was “merely 
because of his exclusion therefrom. He does not become one of the 
people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an 
attempt to enter, forbidden by law.”91 Fuller went on to reason that 
“[e]ven if Turner . . . only regarded the absence of government as a 
political ideal . . . when he sought to attain it by advocating 
[anarchy] . . . we cannot say that the inference was unjustifiable either 
that he contemplated the ultimate realization of his ideal by the use of 
force, or that his speeches were incitements to that end.”92 Thus, 
simply advocating anarchism was enough justification for the 
government to exclude Turner, something Mill clearly would not have 
supported. It is noteworthy that Justice Holmes participated in this 
case and sided with Fuller and the majority. 
Holmes penned the opinion of the Court in Patterson v. Colorado, 
a case where a 7-2 majority upheld a contempt conviction against 
newspaper publisher Thomas Patterson for printing articles and a 
cartoon critical of the state’s supreme court.93 Finding no violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Holmes wrote that it could not be shown 
that the contempt conviction was arbitrary, and as such, the decision 
was “a matter of local law.”94 After deferring to the state on the 
contempt matter, Holmes, in addressing the freedom of expression 
issue, declined to definitively state if the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated the freedom of expression.95 Holmes opined that even if 
the freedom of expression is protected against state infringement, the 
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freedom of speech under the First Amendment merely prohibits prior 
restraints.96 Accordingly, Holmes declared that the Constitution does 
“not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed 
contrary to the public welfare.”97 Holmes then made what was 
quintessentially an anti-Millian statement: “[t]he preliminary freedom 
extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment 
may extend as well to the true as to the false.”98 In other words, even if 
the prohibition on prior restraint protects false speech, the government 
may, in pursuance of a vague notion of “public welfare,” subsequently 
punish both false and true speech. 
It was not long before the Justices upheld a blanket prior restraint. 
Eight years after upholding Patterson’s seditious libel conviction, the 
Court, in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 
subsequently found no violation in a state-created review board that 
had the power to screen all movies before they could be publicly 
shown.99 Justice Joseph McKenna wrote, for a unanimous Court, that 
although films may have many praiseworthy qualities, “they may be 
used for evil” as well, especially if they are shown to children or if “a 
prurient interest may be excited and appealed to” in a film.100 Even 
though the power of this Ohio review board was challenged because it 
was a type of prior restraint, McKenna rejected this by simply finding 
that motion pictures were not subject to a constitutional protection of 
the freedom of speech: “the exhibition of moving pictures is a 
business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like 
other spectacles, not to be regarded . . . we think, as part of the press of 
the country, or as organs of public opinion.”101 Like in Turner and 
Patterson, Justice Holmes sided with the majority in taking this rather 
crabbed, non-Millian view of the freedom of speech. 
Holmes’s approach to these issues began to change at the close of 
World War I in Schenck v. United States, a case where Holmes again 
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wrote for the Court. Charles Schenck was prosecuted for violating the 
Espionage Act after producing thousands of leaflets urging draft 
resistance and mailing them to draft-eligible persons.102 Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Holmes upheld Schenck’s conviction, stating 
that, regarding the freedom of speech, “[t]he question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such 
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”103 
Since Congress has the authority to regulate the military, and since the 
distribution of the leaflets in question could obstruct draft recruitment, 
Holmes sustained Schenck’s conviction.104 Holmes’s reasoning in the 
case was quite Millian, in that he found speech to be protected unless it 
is used to create a secondary danger where there is no time for 
reasoned, dispassionate discussion of the issue.105 However, Holmes 
applied this Millian standard improperly, as it is quite difficult to argue 
that Schenck’s leaflets were, in the immediate moment, about to 
substantively harm the U.S. war effort; indeed, there were only 
15,000–16,000 of these documents printed in Philadelphia for 
distribution,106 with no evidence provided that any draftee declined to 
report due to reading them. The suppression was grounded in language 
of the prevention of a “clear and present” harm, but the application of 
the test was done in a way that was very deferential to the 
government’s power to censor ideas it found disagreeable.107 
Nevertheless, Holmes’s opinion for the Court in Schenck 
represents a different approach to the freedom of expression than what 
Holmes had previously reasoned in Patterson. What affected his shift 
in reasoning on this issue? Holmes frequently met and corresponded 
with Harvard lecturer Harold Laski, and in a noteworthy letter dated 
February 28, 1919, Holmes alluded to the fact that he had recently 
“reread Mill on [sic] Liberty” and referred to Mill positively as a “fine 
old sportsman.”108 This letter, written one week before Schenck was 
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released,109 demonstrates that Mill’s On Liberty was on Holmes’s 
mind while he was penning the Court’s opinion. In fact, Laski—a 
strong free speech advocate who studied Mill—recommended that 
Holmes take another look at On Liberty.110 
However, Holmes received significant criticism in legal circles 
after authoring the Court’s opinion in Schenck, with some scholars 
claiming the case did little to protect the freedom of speech.111 Most 
notably, Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee criticized Holmes in 
a law review article released in June of 1919.112 That same article also 
referenced Mill on free speech multiple times.113 Justice Holmes 
appeared to have taken note of this and other criticism, reevaluating 
his application of the Clear and Present Danger Test. When the Court 
was asked to review another Espionage Act conviction several months 
after Schenck, in Abrams v. United States, Holmes found himself 
dissenting from a decision upholding the prosecution. The majority in 
Abrams took a hardline stance limiting the freedom of expression, 
claiming that speech could be punished if it produced a bad tendency, 
in this case the intention of promoting a general workers’ strike.114 
Here the Court could not be said to be employing Mill’s indispensable 
proviso, as there was no imminent threat of harm. There is no evidence 
that anyone was swayed—or that many people could reasonably be 
expected to be swayed—to strike due to what Holmes, in dissent, 
called “a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”115 The Court majority, in 
adopting this more deferential Bad Tendency Test, was making use of 
an old British standard for free speech cases that dated back to Regina 
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v. Hicklin.116 Holmes, however, continued to embrace a more Millian 
approach to the freedom of speech in his dissent, declaring that: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises 
or your power and want a certain result with all your 
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and 
sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by 
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech 
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the 
circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the 
result, or that you doubt either your power or your 
premises. But when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It 
is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every 
year if not every day we have to wager our salvation 
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. 
While that experiment is part of our system I think that 
we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to 
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and 
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with the 
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country.117 
There is quite a bit of Mill’s political theory contained in this dense 
paragraph by Holmes. It is reminiscent of On Liberty, in that it 
proclaims “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the . . . market.”118 Mill’s notion of the fallibility of 
human knowledge is also quite evident in Holmes’s proclamation “that 
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time has upset many fighting faiths.”119 And the concept of protecting 
a broad range of expression, even those views “we loathe and believe 
to be fraught with death,”120 continues Mill’s proclamations on 
allowing speech that is both believed to be false and that is delivered 
by intemperate means. Thus, Mill’s influence on Holmes’s thought is 
quite evident. Holmes becomes the important bridge for the purposes 
of our current discussion because he turns what is otherwise political 
theory espoused by a foreign philosopher into an explanation of the 
meaning of the U.S. Constitution by a sitting Supreme Court Justice. 
As we shall show below, the precedential value of prior opinions 
would lead future Supreme Court Justices to adopt this approach as 
well. 
The espousal of the Holmes/Mill approach to free speech was not 
immediate, however. In Abrams, Holmes was joined solely in dissent 
by Justice Louis Brandeis, who would join with Holmes several times 
over the next decade in dissents (or concurrences) against majorities 
that upheld speech prosecutions.121 One notable example was Gitlow v. 
New York, which involved the prosecution of a communist who 
printed a pamphlet (the Left Wing Manifesto) advocating for the 
overthrow of capitalism in the United States.122 Justice Edward 
Sanford, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the Bad Tendency Test, 
declaring that “the general provisions of the statute may be 
constitutionally applied to the specific utterance of the defendant if its 
natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive 
evil which the legislative body might prevent.”123 In dissent, Justice 
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It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, 
that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It 
offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on 
unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of 
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only 
difference between the expression of an opinion and an 
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s 
enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to 
reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant 
discourse before us it had no chance of starting a 
present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs 
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be 
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the 
only meaning of free speech is that they should be given 
their chance and have their way.124 
Again, the influence of Mill is evident. Holmes’s dissent directly 
draws from the “positive instigation” test from Mill’s proviso.125 
Finding no immediate danger of lawlessness, Holmes rejected the 
majority’s reasoning.126 For many people, the ideas expressed by 
Gitlow in the Left Wing Manifesto were wrong, but for Holmes that 
was not a sufficient reason to ban the ideas or to punish the speaker. In 
fact, according to Holmes, if there is time for debate we must let these 
ideas be discussed, just as advocated by Mill. Holmes did not think 
these ideas would command majoritarian support, but if they did, that 
is what the freedom of expression is ultimately meant to protect. Put 
another way by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, “the 
necessity which is essential to a valid restriction [on expression] does 
not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a 
clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State 
constitutionally may seek to prevent.”127 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE WITH THE 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Over the next few decades, especially after the retirement of 
Holmes and Brandeis, the Court struggled to determine what was 
protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. For instance, 
in Thomas v. Collins the Court provided reasoning very protective of 
free expression, extolling “the preferred place given in our scheme to 
the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First 
Amendment,”128 which mandates that “any attempt to restrict those 
liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not 
doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger.”129 Yet 
several years later, during the Red Scare, the Court declared in Dennis 
v. United States that “the societal value of speech must, on occasion, 
be subordinated to other values and considerations.”130 The majority in 
Dennis went on to fashion a test for the freedom of speech in which 
the Court would “ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by 
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger.”131 This standard bears some similarities to 
Holmes’s Clear and Present Danger Test, but the language and 
application in the Dennis opinion suggest that it was more of a Clear 
and Probable Danger test.132 In addition, it was during this era that the 
Court formally established that certain categories of speech were 
wholly outside of First Amendment protection, including “the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ 
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace.”133 During the same time 
period, the Court also declared that commercial speech had no First 
Amendment protection by stating that although the freedom of speech 
is generally protected in public forums, “the Constitution imposes no 
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such restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising.”134 
Nevertheless, like Holmes and Brandeis before them, Justice Hugo 
Black and Justice William Douglas continued to carry the torch for a 
more Millian interpretation of the freedom of expression. Writing in 
dissent in Dennis, Justice Black declared a form of First Amendment 
absolutism: 
Undoubtedly, a governmental policy of unfettered 
communication of ideas does entail dangers. To the 
Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived 
from free expression were worth the risk. They 
embodied this philosophy in the First Amendment’s 
command that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press . . . .”135 
Likewise, Justice Douglas’s Dennis dissent reads like a summary of 
On Liberty: 
Free speech has occupied an exalted position because 
of the high service it has given our society. Its 
protection is essential to the very existence of a 
democracy. The airing of ideas releases pressures 
which otherwise might become destructive. When ideas 
compete in the market for acceptance, full and free 
discussion exposes the false and they gain few 
adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we 
hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and 
preconceptions. Full and free discussion keeps a society 
from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the 
stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations 
apart.136 
All of the major arguments from Mill’s chapter “Of the Liberty of 
Thought and Discussion” are present in Douglas’s dissent: the freedom 
of speech is utile in that it fosters democratic government, the freedom 
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of speech helps lead to the discovery of truth, and protecting even false 
or dangerous speech forces us to recall the reasons for our own beliefs 
and prevents us from “falling asleep” at our posts. Unlike Black, 
Douglas made repeated references to the Clear and Present Danger 
Test in his Dennis dissent,137 and concluded his opinion by specifically 
citing to Holmes: “There have been numerous First Amendment cases 
before the Court raising the issue of clear and present danger since Mr. 
Justice Holmes first formulated the test in Schenck v. United States.”138 
Thus, the connection to Mill—through Holmes—was being carried on 
by other Justices decades after Holmes’s death. 
However much Black and Douglas were, like Holmes and 
Brandeis, extending the Millian line of thinking, some of their most 
notable opinions were concurrences or dissents on these questions.139 
The majority of Justices on the Court did not adhere to Mill’s 
philosophy on the freedom of speech during the 1950s and into the 
1960s. The Court’s move toward a more libertarian view of the 
freedom of speech was evident, however, by the time the Justices 
decided Brandenburg v. Ohio. Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan 
(“KKK”) leader who invited a TV reporter and camera crew to a KKK 
rally; at the rally, Brandenburg made racist remarks and threatened to 
take “revengent” action on the President, Congress, and the Supreme 
Court if certain demands were not met.140 After being convicted of 
violating an Ohio syndicalism statute, he appealed his case to the 
Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declared that:  
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free 
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
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producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.141  
In other words, the Court adopted a standard for incitement cases 
where the freedom of speech is protected unless the speaker is stirring 
the listener(s) to break the law in the immediate future and such action 
is expected. This is remarkably similar to Mill’s statement in On 
Liberty that the freedom of speech should be generally protected, but 
also that “opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in 
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a 
positive instigation to some mischievous act.”142 Mill emphasized that 
even mischievous opinions “ought to be unmolested when simply 
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when 
delivered orally to an excited mob” because of the threat of physical 
“harm to others.”143 A united Court declared a Millian and Holmesian 
standard for the freedom of speech, one that is controlling for 
questions related to incitement in the twenty-first century.144 
At first glance, Brandenburg may appear to be a culmination of a 
move by the Court toward a more strident Millian position on the 
freedom of speech. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Court was 
narrowing the definition of obscenity,145 beginning to create 
protections for offensive speech,146 giving greater protection to the 
press against libel suits,147 and, at one point, even making a very 
Millian declaration that “[u]nder the First Amendment, there is no 
such thing as a false idea.”148 These points notwithstanding, 
Brandenburg and other cases decided during the height of the Warren 
Court and early Burger Court did not lead to a fundamental, permanent 
shift in the Court’s understanding of the freedom of speech. The 
fighting words doctrine remained undisturbed.149 No Court decision 
offered any protection to hate speech during the Warren Court era. In 
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United States v. O’Brien, the Court restricted protections for symbolic 
speech and upheld the prosecution of protestors who burned their draft 
cards, and in doing so devised a four-part test for symbolic expression 
that was very deferential to government interests.150 Furthermore, 
within five years of Brandenburg, the Court expanded the definition of 
obscenity in Miller v. California,151 and made it easier to sue for libel 
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.152 During the same period, the Court 
also allowed for significant regulation of broadcast media in Red Lion 
Broadcasting v. FCC and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.153 The Court 
issued a mixed ruling on the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(“FECA”) of 1971, striking down federal candidate expenditure limits 
as violating the First Amendment but upholding contribution limits to 
federal candidates in Buckley v. Valeo.154 Thus, even after 
Brandenburg, the Court had not adopted Mill’s views in wholesale 
form. Ultimately, the shift initiated by the Court in the 1960s would 
instead be brought to fruition during the late 1980s, 1990s, and the 
early twenty–first century. 
V. A MAJORITY OF THE COURT ADOPTS MILL’S POSITION ON THE 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The Court’s strong move toward a Millian approach to the freedom 
of speech, on a consistent basis, began in 1989 with Texas v. Johnson. 
After Gregory Johnson burned the U.S. flag as part of a political 
protest taking place outside the 1984 Republican National Convention, 
he was convicted of violating a Texas statute prohibiting the 
“desecration of a venerated object.”155 Writing for a 5-4 majority, 
Justice William Brennan overturned Johnson’s conviction on First 
Amendment grounds, finding that Texas was unconstitutionally 
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engaging in viewpoint discrimination: “We never before have held that 
the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to express only one 
view of that symbol or its referents.”156 He also stated the following, 
which is very similar to Mill’s position in On Liberty: “If there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”157 Although the 
Court did not overrule what it characterized as the “relatively lenient 
standard” toward government interests in O’Brien, the Court created 
new law and found that since the government interest was related “to 
the ‘suppression of free expression,’” the case was “outside of 
O’Brien’s test altogether.”158 This greatly limited the use of O’Brien in 
symbolic speech cases.159 The Court shifted away from giving the 
government more power to restrain symbolic speech and opened the 
door for much greater protection of this type of expression.160 
Three years later in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the Court eviscerated what 
had been its consistent fighting words doctrine since the 1940s. R.A.V. 
involved a minor white male who assembled a cross out of chair legs 
and, with several other teenagers, burned it in the yard of an African-
American family living in his neighborhood.161 St. Paul charged 
R.A.V. with violating the city’s Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, 
which prohibited using certain objects, including a burning cross, in a 
way that “one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses 
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion or gender . . . .”162 Even though the case involved hate speech, 
the Supreme Court unanimously overturned his conviction, with the 
majority concluding that the ordinance engaged in both content and 
viewpoint discrimination, which is unconstitutional even if the 
expression can be categorized as “fighting words.”163 Justice Antonin 
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Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that “St. Paul has no such 
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”164 
Although the symbolic speech in question is clearly something that 
would qualify as fighting words, the Court ruled that because St. Paul 
disfavored the viewpoint expressed by the burning cross, the ordinance 
was unconstitutional.165 
Over a decade later in Virginia v. Black, the Court would affirm 
that cross-burning cannot be prosecuted unless it constitutes a “true 
threat,”166 which includes “statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”167 
Thus, the Court unquestionably left in place the protection of any 
political messages or hate speech that is carried out by such an act, 
only restricting a realistic danger of physical harm to others.168 These 
cases moved the Court further toward a Millian position on hate 
speech and symbolic speech, as they permit what Mill called the 
“absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,”169 even in 
cases where the expression in question involves “intemperate 
discussion, [including] invective . . . and the like.”170 
The Court’s drive toward Mill’s position on free expression was 
further exemplified by its commercial speech decisions in 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island and Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States. The 44 Liquormart case involved 
a state ban on alcohol advertising, with an exception allowing only for 
“price tags or signs displayed” in a liquor store that were “not visible 
from the street.”171 The Court struck down the prohibition, advancing a 
test developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York.172 The strength of Central Hudson’s 
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test for protection of commercial speech, however, had been in doubt 
since the Court used the Central Hudson test in Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico to uphold a restriction 
on advertising for casino gambling from being targeted to residents, 
despite the fact that casino gambling was legal and could be advertised 
to tourists.173 In announcing the judgment of the 44 Liquormart Court, 
Justice John Paul Stevens noted that: 
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers 
from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest 
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will 
respond “irrationally” to the truth. The First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of 
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for 
what the government perceives to be their own good. 
That teaching applies equally to state attempts to 
deprive consumers of accurate information about their 
chosen products.174 
This reasoning is in line with Mill’s in that it strikes down a law that 
prevents people from advertising and learning truthful information 
about products that the government has deemed to be immoral.175 
Indeed, Mill was clear that one’s “own good, either physical or moral, 
is not a sufficient warrant” to restrict expression.176 Along with others, 
this case has proved to move the Court permanently away from a more 
restrictive approach regarding commercial speech.177 Even though the 
Court maintained its four-part Central Hudson test in 44 Liquormart, 
three years later in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United 
States, the Court confirmed its stronger protection of commercial 
speech when it struck down a prohibition on television and radio 
advertisements for private casino gambling when “such gambling is 
legal.”178 This ruling buried Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates 
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without specifically overruling it. In Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Ass’n, the Court reaffirmed “the presumption that the 
speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to assess 
the value of accurate and nonmisleading information about lawful 
conduct.”179 Like 44 Liquormart, the case promotes the Harm 
Principle understanding of free speech, letting people learn 
information about gambling and allowing them to make their own 
determination regarding whether they want to engage in the activity or 
not. 
When asked for the first time how to interpret speech on the 
Internet in Reno v. ACLU, the Court gave it a strong level of 
protection, much greater than what the Court afforded to speech on 
other media developed in the twentieth century, such as radio and 
television.180 It was also an opportunity for the Court to revisit the 
Miller test on obscenity and decide how it would be applied online.181 
Reno involved the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which 
prohibited online indecent or obscene communication to minors. The 
CDA had failed to sufficiently define what constituted “indecent” 
communication,182 and the law’s reference to “obscene” material 
encompassed only one portion of the Court’s Miller test.183 Justice 
Stevens, writing for the Court, declared that the more restrictive 
prohibitions for broadcast media announced in Red Lion and Pacifica 
would not apply to the Internet, in part, because there was no history 
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of regulation on the Internet like there was for broadcast media.184 
Putting aside the potential problem in the Court’s logic (that letting a 
law regulating speech on a medium of communication stand in 
operation for a longer period of time before being brought to the Court 
should result in less constitutional protection afforded to speech on 
that medium), the Court clearly moved to a more Millian approach to 
protecting expression. Lest there be any doubt in this presumption, 
Justice Stevens’s words later in the Court’s opinion demonstrate the 
point when explaining why the CDA’s restrictions on Internet 
expression were overbroad:  
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the 
governmental interest in protecting children from 
harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an 
unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to 
adults. As we have explained, the Government may not 
“reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is 
fit for children.”185  
This fits Mill’s ideas from On Liberty quite well: it protects a right of 
expression for adults, even when dealing with topics and speech 
content many people would find to be immoral. Mill intended the 
protection of not only speech but also sexual activities with his Harm 
Principle,186 so the application of it in Reno v. ACLU to strike down 
the CDA was certainly Millian. 
The Court followed Reno v. ACLU with an even more protective 
ruling for Internet speech in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.187 This 
time, the federal law at issue was the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act (“CPPA”).188 The Act “extends the federal prohibition against 
child pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict 
minors but were produced without using any real children” which 
could include images using adults who appear to be children or images 
enhanced using computer imaging programs.189 Even though the Court 
had upheld child pornography laws that banned non-obscene images 
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for two decades, dating back to New York v. Ferber—where the Court 
emphasized the physiological, emotional, and mental harms to children 
involved in the production of such materials190—the Court’s majority 
reasoned in Free Speech Coalition that the CPPA was different. The 
Ferber Court had noted that the value of permitting child pornography 
“is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis,”191 but the Court in Free 
Speech Coalition nevertheless held that “where the speech is neither 
obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the 
protection of the First Amendment” and “some works in this category 
might have significant value,”192 resulting in the majority declaring 
that the CPPA was overbroad.193 Without the direct physical harm 
presented in Ferber, the Court in Free Speech Coalition drew a 
distinction that reflects the Harm Principle and struck down the 
application of the law at issue. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
concurrence in part pointed out, virtual child pornography serves to 
“whet the appetites of child molesters . . . who may use the images to 
seduce young children”194 and “defendants indicted for the production, 
distribution, or possession of actual child pornography may evade 
liability by claiming that the images attributed to them are in fact 
computer-generated.”195 However, the majority protected virtual child 
pornography for reasons that echoed On Liberty. Reno v. ACLU and 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition combined serve as statements by the 
Court that Internet expression between adults—even if it includes 
images or statements that are indecent, borderline obscene, or virtual 
child pornography—are protected by the First Amendment. The two 
cases demonstrate the Court’s Millian position regarding Internet 
speech, in that they permit speech that does not cause a direct tangible 
harm to someone else;196 they also call into question the Court’s 
approach to obscenity that had remained stable since Miller.197 
In another context, the Court has gravitated toward what the 
majority would see as a Millian position on freedom of expression 
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regarding campaign finance, which is amply demonstrated by Citizens 
United v. FEC and McCutcheon v. FEC. Each case involved different 
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act (“BCRA”) of 
2002, which amended FECA.198 The Court had previously taken an 
approach toward campaign finance that limited the First Amendment 
protection afforded to this type of expression, including by upholding 
contribution limits in Buckley199 and by upholding limits on 
independent expenditures by corporations in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.200 As recently as 2003, the Court in 
McConnell v. FEC upheld by a 5-4 vote the BCRA’s ban on 
electioneering communications by labor unions and corporations thirty 
days before a primary and sixty days before a general election.201 In 
doing so, the Court majority in McConnell used a standard of review, 
‘“closely drawn’ scrutiny,” that it had utilized since Buckley in 
campaign finance cases;202 this is also a standard of review that is less 
protective of free expression than the more rigorous strict scrutiny 
standard.203 The Court continued its use of the closely drawn scrutiny 
in McConnell because it reasoned that “[o]ur treatment of contribution 
restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First 
Amendment freedoms”204 and it “shows proper deference to Congress’ 
ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which 
it enjoys particular expertise.”205 
By 2010, however, the Court majority had changed. In Citizens 
United, the Court, after Justice Samuel Alito was appointed to the seat 
vacated by Justice O’Connor, struck down BCRA’s ban on labor union 
and corporation independent expenditures for electioneering 
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communications by a 5-4 vote.206 In doing so, the Court overruled 
Austin’s upholding of a law that limited corporate independent 
expenditures,207 and the Court overruled the portions of McConnell 
that upheld restrictions on corporate independent expenditures.208 
Overall, the majority in Citizens United reversed its older rulings by 
holding that “[l]aws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict 
scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 
‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.’”209 Thus, the Court held that all forms of political speech, 
even those that are sponsored by corporations at election time, would 
be given a high level of protection by the First Amendment. According 
to Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, this approach 
was required because “the First Amendment stands against attempts to 
disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.”210 Put another way, the Court 
justified striking down the relevant law for the same reason that Mill 
opposed restrictions on expression: government may not deem that 
certain positions are the “truth” or that certain types of communication 
should be less favored.211 
The Court’s more protective approach toward the speech elements 
of campaign finance was expressed again four years later in 
McCutcheon v. FEC.212 This time, the regulation at issue was the 
BCRA’s restrictions on how much individual campaign donors could 
directly contribute to federal candidates and noncandidate committees 
during every two-year election cycle, which was a total of $123,200 in 
2013–14.213 Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for a plurality of the 
Court, struck down this aggregate limit, stating that “[t]he right to 
participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by 
the First Amendment . . . .”214 Chief Justice Roberts stated that even 
though this form of expression “may at times seem repugnant to 
some,” and that many “would be delighted to see fewer television 
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commercials touting a candidate’s accomplishments or disparaging an 
opponent’s character,” such unwelcome speech is still protected by the 
First Amendment.215 In this vein, Roberts argued that “[t]he 
Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a 
donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates 
it may endorse.”216 Here, Roberts adopted a Millian utilitarian 
approach to expression in McCutcheon similar to what the Court 
decided in Citizens United: the freedom of speech protects the greater 
good, even if the expression being restricted is seen as “repugnant” to 
some Americans. The logic here is not that such unrestricted funding 
will increase the likelihood of discovering the truth but rather, the 
greater good is the protection of the method of expression itself. The 
fifth vote to strike down these restrictions belonged to Justice Clarence 
Thomas, who would have gone even further by overruling Buckley and 
finding all campaign contributions limits unconstitutional.217 Whether 
Mill himself would have viewed campaign contributions as “speech” 
is immaterial; what is clear in these campaign finance cases is that the 
Court applies Mill’s approach to an activity the Court deems to 
involve political speech. 
United States v. Stevens took the Supreme Court into yet another 
area of expression. For the first time, the majority found that 
depictions of animal cruelty have constitutional protection.218 Stevens 
involved a federal law which prohibited the portrayal of animal cruelty 
in any visual or audio depiction “‘in which a living animal is 
intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,’ if that 
conduct violates federal or state law where ‘the creation, sale, or 
possession takes place.’”219 The law exempted depictions with 
“serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, 
historical, or artistic value.”220 Writing for an 8-1 majority, Chief 
Justice Roberts struck down the provision, stating that, although there 
remains a small number of unprotected classes of speech (including 
obscenity, defamation, incitement, and child pornography),221 
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“Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of 
the First Amendment.”222 The Court made clear that new emerging 
categories of unprotected speech will be exceptionally rare, and the 
norm is that classes of speech that are protected now cannot be 
restricted in the future.223 For the Chief Justice, the “First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to 
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social 
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by 
the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs.”224 The Court concluded that the 
statute was “substantially overbroad,” and was therefore invalid under 
the First Amendment.225 Overall, it is another case extending the line 
of thinking expressed by Mill in On Liberty: the speech expressed 
messages which many people find to be abhorrent, but in true 
utilitarian fashion, the Chief Justice explained that the benefits of 
limiting the power of the state to regulate speech outweigh the costs of 
censorship when there is no direct harm to another person. 
One year after Stevens, the Court decided Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n. The case challenged a California law that prohibited 
the sale or rental to minors of “violent video games” (including games 
where players can engage in the “killing, maiming, dismembering, or 
sexually assaulting the image of a human being” if done according to 
the Miller obscenity standard).226 Justice Scalia, writing for a 7-2 
majority, struck down the regulation, finding it to be underinclusive by 
not banning all violent content from children (e.g. violent cartoons) 
and also overinclusive by banning the sale of videogames to children 
whose parents did not object to them playing such games.227 At first 
blush this may seem like a restriction on the speech of minors that 
would fit one of Mill’s categories that is permissible. However, unlike 
the Morse v. Frederick case below, the Brown case was not solely 
about restricting the speech of young people with less than fully 
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developed intellectual capacities. The statute was also restricting the 
freedom of expression for the makers and sellers of video games, and 
it was restricting the choices of parents as to what media they wanted 
to allow their children to access. 
Indeed, the Brown Court declared in no uncertain terms that “video 
games qualify for First Amendment protection,”228 and that although 
the “Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on 
public matters . . . we have long recognized that it is difficult to 
distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”229 For 
the Court, this was clearly a case where protecting public discourse 
was at issue (at least potentially), so restrictions on the content of 
speech, such as in the relevant California law, are subject to the 
highest level of constitutional scrutiny, the strict scrutiny test.230 In the 
course of his majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted that minors 
themselves are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment 
protection, although it is less protection than is afforded to adults.231 
And even though the types of messages that were targeted by this law 
were excessively violent and misogynistic, the Court concluded that 
“disgust is not a valid basis for restricting expression.”232 All told, the 
case reminds us that, in Millian fashion, minors do not have full free 
speech rights (although they certainly have some), and speech that is 
considered vile receives a great deal of protection if it is made by 
adults and potentially contains discourse on public matters. 
The same year that the Court struck down a prohibition on selling 
violent video games to minors, the Court protected offensive speech in 
another context in Snyder v. Phelps. After Marine Lance Corporal 
Matthew Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty, his father, 
Albert Snyder, arranged for his funeral to take place in Snyder’s 
hometown of Westminster, Maryland.233 Fred Phelps’s Westboro 
Baptist Church, which has a history of picketing at funerals,234 
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including military funerals,235 chose to picket near Snyder’s funeral 
with homophobic messages expressing a view that that God hates and 
punishes the United States for its tolerance of gays and lesbians, 
particularly within the military.236 Albert Snyder later filed a lawsuit 
claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress because of his 
exposure to the signs Westboro Baptist Church displayed at a site near 
the funeral.237 At trial, a jury awarded him $2.9 million in 
compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, which was 
reduced by the trial court to $2.1 million.238 The Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, overturned the jury awards 
by an 8-1 vote.239 According to the Chief Justice, “[t]he Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort 
suits, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.”240 
Although the majority gave special protection to “speech on public 
issues”241 above speech on “matters of purely private significance,”242 
the Court did not probe the limits of expression rights for the latter 
category because the Court determined that the Westboro Baptist 
Church’s speech in this case was on matters of public concern, broadly 
defined by the Court.243 The Chief Justice concluded that since 
“Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public 
concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First 
Amendment.”244 Furthermore, the Court concluded that even though 
the Church’s signs included messages that were homophobic, hateful, 
unpatriotic, and perhaps blasphemous, “[s]uch speech cannot be 
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”245 The 
majority concluded with the following Millian sentiment: 
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Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move 
them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did 
here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we 
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a 
Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect 
even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we 
do not stifle public debate.246  
Without using the phrase “Harm Principle,” the Court certainly applied 
it in this case. 
United States v. Alvarez dealt with the constitutionality of the 
Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalizes false representations 
about having been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by 
Congress for the U.S. armed forces.247 Xavier Alvarez was convicted 
of violating this law when, as a board member of the Three Valley 
Water District Board, he falsely introduced himself at his first public 
meeting as having been a retired Marine who was awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.248 The Court overturned Alvarez’s 
conviction, with Justice Kennedy reasoning that “falsity alone may not 
suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”249 This is an 
important point to the case because Alvarez was not making false 
statements about anyone else, nor was he trying to use false statements 
to financially defraud anyone.250 Given the blanket prohibition the law 
had on one’s false statements about being awarded medals, it called 
into question theatrical performances or lies whispered within one’s 
home.251 For Kennedy, this went too far: 
Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful 
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, 
absent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a 
material advantage, it would give government a broad 
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or 
in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for 
the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First 
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Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and 
discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.252 
This broad protection of speech, even speech we know is false and can 
factually verify to be false, still deserves constitutional protection 
according to the Court because of the greater danger posed by the 
government being able to censor speech. Like Mill, the Court in 
Alvarez tells us that allowing false speech actually protects the search 
for truth. Indeed, reminiscent of Mill, the Court’s answer is more 
speech, not less: “The Government has not shown, and cannot show, 
why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest. The facts 
of this case indicate that the dynamics of free speech, of 
counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie.”253 
The Court in McCullen v. Coakley struck down a Massachusetts 
law that prohibited knowingly standing on a public way or sidewalk 
that was within thirty-five feet of a facility or a hospital where 
abortions were performed.254 The law was challenged by Eleanor 
McCullen, who represented a group that engaged in what it styled 
“sidewalk counseling” outside of abortion clinics to offer information 
about abortion alternatives.255 According to Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for a unanimous Court, this wide buffer zone was not narrowly 
tailored because it compromised a speaker’s “ability to initiate the 
close, personal conversations that they view as essential to ‘sidewalk 
counseling.’”256 The buffer zone often forced these speakers to raise 
their voices so the patients could hear them, which was “a mode of 
communication sharply at odds with the compassionate message” they 
desired to express.257 It also made it difficult for speakers to approach 
patients to offer them literature.258 The messages of these “sidewalk 
counselors” were probably unwelcome to many of the patients and 
other persons entering the clinics or hospitals in question. However, 
following Millian reasoning, the Court struck down the buffer zone in 
a scenario where there was no realistic threat of violence and where 
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there was opportunity for patients to ignore their messages or provide 
their own counterspeech against perceived falsehoods. 
Furthermore, Packingham v. North Carolina involved a state law 
that prohibited registered sex offenders from using social media 
websites that were also accessible to children.259 In an extension of 
Reno v. ACLU, the Court found the statute to be overbroad because the 
state “with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the 
principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for 
employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and 
otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and 
knowledge.”260 According to Justice Kennedy, since social media 
websites “can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms 
available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard,” the Court 
found unconstitutional a complete prohibition on registered sex 
offenders accessing them.261 Such an approach echoes Mill: speech by 
an adult that is orderly (and perhaps even true) cannot be banned with 
no evidence of immediate tangible harm to someone else. 
Finally, for two recent cases involving the freedom of speech as it 
applies to trademarks, one can examine Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. 
Brunetti. At issue in Matal was an application for a trademark by an 
Asian-American band called “The Slants.”262 The name, a pejorative 
term for Asian-Americans, was chosen by the band as a way to help 
“reclaim” the phrase.263 However, the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) refused to process the application, finding it to be in violation 
of the Lanham Act, which prohibits trademarks that “disparage” any 
persons.264 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Alito struck down 
the law, finding that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it 
expresses ideas that offend.”265 The Court even went so far as to say 
that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”266 As in R.A.V. and Snyder, the 
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Court in Matal found protected expression even when there was, in the 
words of Mill, “intemperate discussion,” including “invective.”267 
Similarly, in Iancu, the PTO refused to register a trademark for 
Erik Brunetti’s clothing line, called FUCT, on the grounds that the 
name violated the Lanham Act’s prohibition on “immoral[ ] or 
scandalous” trademarks.268 Writing for the Court, Justice Elena Kagan 
put forth Millian reasoning on the issue, disapproving the fact that “the 
PTO has refused to register marks communicating ‘immoral’ or 
‘scandalous’ views about (among other things) drug use, religion, and 
terrorism. But all the while, it has approved registration of marks 
expressing more accepted views on the same topics.”269 Accordingly, 
the Court found the PTO’s refusal to be unconstitutional,270 just as in 
Matal, reasoning in Iancu that “[i]f the ‘immoral or scandalous’ 
bar . . . discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, it must also collide 
with our First Amendment doctrine.”271 In Iancu, the Court struck 
down the application of a law that prohibited “immoral” expression,272 
finding that this reason alone is, in the words of Mill, “not a sufficient 
warrant”273 to ban speech. Like in Matal, Mill’s influence in Iancu is 
abundantly clear. 
VI. THE CURRENT COURT’S FREE SPEECH EXCEPTIONS ARE 
(ARGUABLY) MILL’S FREE SPEECH EXCEPTIONS 
In recent years, the Justices continue to place some limits on the 
freedom of expression, notwithstanding the trend of the modern 
Court’s pro-free speech cases explored above. Indeed, the Court has 
not simply struck down every government attempt to restrict and even 
ban speech in the twenty-first century, as the First Amendment 
absolutist Hugo Black might have advised. However, the cases 
upholding government restrictions on expression are, at the very least, 
more examples of the Court using a Millian philosophy, with both the 
majority and dissents disagreeing with each other about how to apply 
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Millian principles. Even more to the point, in these cases one can also 
argue that the majority’s rulings are in line with Mill’s position in On 
Liberty, in that they do not extend the protection of the First 
Amendment to classes of people whom Mill also would not have given 
protection, or they arguably involve incitement. Although we can 
debate how well the Court has applied these exceptions by Mill, there 
is no question that the Justices are debating within Mill’s framework, 
even if they may be misinterpreting his exceptions. 
One example of this took place in Garcetti v. Ceballos, where a 
Los Angeles County deputy district attorney believed that a search 
warrant affidavit contained inaccuracies and informed the defense 
attorney in the case as such.274 Ceballos claimed that he was then 
subjected to disciplinary action, including “reassignment from his 
calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another 
courthouse, and denial of a promotion.”275 In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
ruled against Ceballos’s claim that his First Amendment rights were 
violated. Reasoning that “[w]hen a citizen enters government service, 
the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her 
freedom,”276 the majority concluded that “when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”277 The majority reached this conclusion, in part, for 
institutional reasons: “Employers have heightened interests in 
controlling speech made by an employee in his or her professional 
capacity. Official communications have official consequences, 
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors 
must ensure that their employees’ official communications are 
accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s 
mission.”278 
The majority saw the situation in Garcetti the same way that Mill 
expressed an exception to protecting the freedom of speech in On 
Liberty, in that working as a deputy district attorney involved what 
Mill might have referred to as “performance of some definite duty 
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incumbent on him to the public.”279 For the Court majority, Ceballos 
voluntarily took on a career as a prosecutor and knew there were 
additional limitations on his freedom of expression compared to other 
members of society, and he could be punished for his speech in ways 
that the general public could not. As we have already seen with the 
Roberts Court, the focus is not on whether a particular action leads to 
the truth but on whether the conceptual architecture of free speech 
protections remains intact. 
There is strong evidence, however, based on Mill’s statements in 
On Liberty quoted above, that he would have wanted someone like 
Ceballos to be able to speak out as a whistleblower, as silencing 
Ceballos was potentially, in Mill’s words, “robbing the human race”280 
by depriving us of “the opportunity of exchanging error for truth.”281 
In his Garcetti dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer also used a Millian 
framework but saw this as not falling into a type of performance-of-
duty exception: “the Constitution itself here imposes speech 
obligations upon the government’s professional employee,” but 
“[w]here professional and special constitutional obligations are both 
present, the need to protect the employee’s speech is augmented, [and] 
the need for broad government authority to control that speech is likely 
diminished . . . .”282 In other words, for Breyer, the personal free 
speech rights of Ceballos trumped the government’s power to limit 
him as a public employee. Regardless of whether the majority or the 
dissent was correctly interpreting one of Mill’s exceptions, both the 
majority and dissent were debating within a Millian framework. 
For another arguable exception to the freedom of speech contained 
in On Liberty, one can look to Morse v. Frederick. At a school 
sanctioned event, a public high school student unfurled a banner that 
read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”283 The student was subsequently 
suspended for ten days.284 That suspension was upheld by a 5-4 vote of 
the Supreme Court because “‘the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings’ . . . and [because] the rights of students ‘must 
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be “applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.”’”285 In particular, Chief Justice Roberts explained for 
the majority that “a principal may, consistent with the First 
Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that 
speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”286 
According to the Chief Justice, schools need greater authority to 
restrict speech that promotes illegal drug use because such activity 
“can cause severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being 
of young people.”287 In other words, like Mill, the Court majority 
restricted the speech of young people here because schools are not 
dealing with “human beings in the maturity of their faculties.”288 
Like in Garcetti, however, one can question whether or not the 
majority’s reasoning in Morse really fits Mill’s exception. As noted by 
Justice Stevens in dissent, given the relatively facile message being 
expressed on the banner, other teenage students possessed sufficient 
faculties to be able to evaluate it and ignore it: 
Admittedly, some high school students (including those 
who use drugs) are dumb. Most students, however, do 
not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most 
students know dumb advocacy when they see it. The 
notion that the message on this banner would actually 
persuade either the average student or even the 
dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most 
implausible.289 
Overall, Stevens argues that the high school students in this case 
possessed the requisite faculties to be afforded the free speech right to 
unfurl a banner expressing this type of idea; in other words, they were 
over the hurdle of maturity that Mill describes in On Liberty. Given 
the message and the age of the students, Stevens contended that their 
rights cannot be completely taken away under these circumstances. 
Mill advocated for more limits on freedom for those who have not 
attained adulthood,290 but he did not argue anywhere in On Liberty for 
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completely taking those rights away either, particularly for students 
who would be of high school age.291 Nevertheless, for present 
purposes it is irrelevant how Mill would have decided Morse; what the 
arguments of the majority and dissent show is that the Justices were 
debating whether or not the facts of the case fit an exception described 
by Mill to the general rule that the freedom of expression is to be 
protected. 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project is another case where the 
Court ruled against the freedom of expression, but it again was 
arguably within Mill’s framework. This case interpreted the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s prohibition on 
providing material support to foreign organizations found to be 
engaging in terrorist activity.292 The prohibition is based on the finding 
that such organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that 
any contribution to such an organization facilitates [their illegal 
activities].”293 After the Secretary of State designated the Partiya 
Karkeran Kurdistan (“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (“LTTE”) as foreign terrorist organizations, the Humanitarian 
Law Project and other plaintiffs filed suit against the U.S. Attorney 
General, claiming that they should be allowed to train members of 
these organizations on how to peacefully resolve their disputes.294 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed that even 
though the law “regulates speech on the basis of its content,”295 the 
statute was constitutional, in part, because the training that the 
Humanitarian Law Project proposed to provide to the groups in 
question could have also been used “as part of a broader strategy to 
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promote terrorism.”296 As Chief Justice Roberts elaborated, “training 
and advising a designated foreign terrorist organization on how to take 
advantage of international entities might benefit that organization in a 
way that facilitates its terrorist activities.”297 Thus, the Court was 
allowing the government to prohibit political speech on matters of 
public concerns (something it has struck down repeatedly in various 
other contexts above) because of the identity and location of one end 
of those in the conversation between the Humanitarian Law Project 
and the PKK or LTTE. Deferring to Congress and the executive 
branch on matters of national security and foreign policy,298 the Court 
treated these interests as more important than the freedom of speech. 
The Court did so, however, because of its concerns about how the 
PKK and LTTE might use the information communicated to them. For 
this reason, what the Court majority argued was something akin to one 
of Mill’s exceptions in On Liberty, in that the Court was essentially 
characterizing these groups in the way that Mill classified 
“barbarians,”299 and possibly also because they were seen by the 
majority as living in “backward states of society.”300 
Although the Humanitarian Law Project and similar groups in the 
U.S. were not engaging in dangerous speech, the Court majority found 
restrictions on their expression constitutional because their speech 
could provide material advantages to the PKK and the LTTE, two 
groups that were already engaged in activities deemed by the U.S. 
government to be terrorist activity.301 The Court majority was not 
permitting the government to shut down other speech by the 
Humanitarian Law Project, so for the majority it was still within the 
same framework as Garcetti and Morse. These points notwithstanding, 
the majority in Holder may have been employing a misrepresentation 
of Mill and using an approach that was more restrictive than Mill’s. 
This may have been a case where, given the ties to terrorism and 
foreign affairs, the majority simply found another exception where 
Mill would not have. The majority saw this as enabling incitement by 
a terrorist organization, but the dissent, penned by Justice Breyer, did 
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not characterize it as such: “Here the plaintiffs seek to advocate 
peaceful, lawful action to secure political ends; and they seek to teach 
others how to do the same. No one contends that the plaintiffs’ speech 
to these organizations can be prohibited as incitement under 
Brandenburg.”302 As with Garcetti and Morse though, the ultimate 
outcome of the case is less interesting for our present purposes than is 
the fact that both the majority and the dissent were arguing about 
whether or not the case fit one of the exceptions to the freedom of 
expression articulated by Mill in On Liberty. 
For a final example of a case where the Court upholds a restriction 
on speech similar to what Mill may have advocated, we can look to 
Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar. Williams-Yulee involved a judicial 
candidate who was found to have violated a provision of the Florida 
Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibited judicial candidates from 
personally soliciting campaign funds, requiring any such funds to be 
raised indirectly by campaign committees.303 Yulee claimed that the 
provision violated her freedom of speech,304 but the Supreme Court, 
writing again through Chief Justice Roberts, held by a vote of 5-4 that 
the provision served to protect “public confidence in judicial 
integrity,” an interest the Court found to be “genuine and 
compelling.”305 The Court also found that the state’s rule was 
appropriately tailored, in that it restricted only “a narrow slice of 
speech,”306 which “leaves judicial candidates free to discuss any issue 
with any person at any time.”307 Thus, this was the rare case where the 
Court found a restriction on the freedom of speech to be constitutional 
under the strict scrutiny test.308 The Court’s ruling in Williams-Yulee, 
by focusing on the interest at stake to the public in the expression of 
judicial candidates who volunteer to engage in the “performance of 
some definite duty incumbent on him [or her] to the public,” 309 can be 
 
302 Id. at 44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
303 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662–64 (2015). 
304 Id. at 1664. 
305 Id. at 1667. 
306 Id. at 1670. 
307 Id. 
308 As Gerard Gunther once famously wrote, strict scrutiny is typically understood 
as being “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
309 MILL, supra note 17, at 79–80; see also Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673. 
2020 Absolute Freedom of Opinion 51 
understood to fit one of the exceptions Mill provides to the general 
rule of protecting the freedom of speech. 
However, as was also true in the last few cases above where the 
Court upheld a restriction on expression, the dissent also put forth an 
argument that this was not an exception to the Millian framework. For 
Justice Kennedy, there was an “irony in the Court’s having concluded 
that the very First Amendment protections judges must enforce should 
be lessened when a judicial candidate’s own speech is at issue.”310 
Instead, Kennedy saw no duty-based limitation that should be placed 
on judicial candidates, as they remain people deserving the protections 
of free speech for the same reasons we protect free speech for 
everyone else: 
First Amendment protections are both personal and 
structural. Free speech begins with the right of each 
person to think and then to express his or her own 
ideas. Protecting this personal sphere of intellect and 
conscience, in turn, creates structural safeguards for 
many of the processes that define a free society. The 
individual speech here is political speech. The process 
is a fair election. These realms ought to be the last 
place, not the first, for the Court to allow 
unprecedented content-based restrictions on speech.311 
Again, such protections for the freedom of speech—emphasizing 
the connection to the freedom of thought, how protecting speech leads 
to a greater good, permitting strong protection for speech without a 
discernable exception—are statements Mill could have made. The 
majority and the dissent remained within Mill’s framework even as 
they disagreed about the proper outcome in Williams-Yulee. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
John Stuart Mill championed a version of the freedom of 
expression in On Liberty that stressed the dangers of government 
restrictions on the freedom of speech. Mill used his Harm Principle to 
guide when the freedom of speech should be protected. The earlier 
history of the Supreme Court is not one that could be characterized as 
following On Liberty with respect to the freedom of speech, as the 
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Justices were routinely upholding restrictions on this right in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; these restrictions deemed 
constitutional by the Court included prior restraints. 
Mill’s idea of the freedom of expression was eventually adopted by 
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis. It was carried on by others, 
including Justice Black and Justice Douglas. Over many years, those 
Justices inserted Mill’s line of thought into Supreme Court case law, 
creating precedential value that could be revisited in a later era. That 
era has arrived, with the Court majority over the last three decades 
consistently using an approach similar to Mill when interpreting the 
Free Speech Clause. Nevertheless, some Justices in the modern era 
have adhered to Mill’s position more than others. When examining the 
cases above, the Justices who have used Mill’s framework the most in 
freedom of expression cases in recent years include Justices Scalia,312 
Kennedy,313 Breyer,314 and Roberts.315 These Justices span from liberal 
to conservative ideologically,316 and they espouse a variety of methods 
of constitutional interpretation.317 But they all have adhered to an 
understanding of the freedom of expression that, channeling through 
past Justices like Holmes and Douglas, has led them back 
intellectually to the thinking of Mill in On Liberty. Indeed, even in 
cases where the Court majority rules against the free speech claim, the 
debate on the Court is within that Millian framework. 
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Regardless of whether the Justices are using Mill’s approach 
because they really believe in following Mill, they are blindly 
following prior opinions that used Mill, or for some other strategic 
reasons, the modern Supreme Court is publicly espousing a Millian 
approach to the freedom of speech. Mill’s influence in American 
constitutional law may not be as great in other substantive areas, but 
his vision of how to protect the freedom of expression has definitely 
found a home in the Court. Although the Justices still maintain that 
some categories of expression receive less protection—or even no 
protection—under the First Amendment,318 the Court has largely 
followed a path in recent years that uses a libertarian analysis. The 
origins of that approach lie with John Stuart Mill and his advocacy of 
the Harm Principle. 
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